

The Economics of European Integration



Chapter 5

Essential Economics of Preferential Liberalisation



The PTA Diagram

- Studying European integrations – e.g. EEC's customs union – which were discriminatory, i.e. preferential requires:
 - at least three countries:
 - at least two integrating nations.
 - at least one excluded nation.
 - Ability to track domestic and international consequences of liberalisation.
- Must MD-MS diagram to allow for two sources of imports.

The PTA Diagram: Free trade eq'm

RoW


Partner

Home

Border price

Border price

Domestic price



X_R RoW Exports

X_P Partner Exports


$M = X^P + X^R$ Home imports

The PTA Diagram: MFN tariff eq'm

RoW

Partner


Home



Discriminatory, unilateral liberalization


- To build up to analysis of real-world policy changes (e.g. customs union):
 - Consider Home removes T on imports only from Partner.
- 1st step is to construct the new MS curve.
 - The liberalisation shifts up MS (as with MFN liberalisation) but not as far since only on half of imports.
 - Shifts up MS to half way between MS (free trade) and MS (MFN T), but
 - More complex, kinked MS curve with PTA.

Discriminatory, unilateral liberalization




Domestic price & border price changes

- domestic price falls to P' from P'' .
- Partner-based firms see border price rise, $P'-T$ to P'' .
- RoW firms see border price fall from $P'-T$ to $P''-T$.





Quantity changes: supply switching

- RoW exports fall.
- Partner exports rise more than RoW exports fall, so
- domestic imports rise.



Impact of customs union formation




Note: Left panel shows share of EEC6's import from the three regions. Other Euro-6 are the 6 countries that joined the EU by the mid 1980s, UK, Ireland, Denmark, Spain, Portugal and Greece.

Source: Table 5, External Trade and Balance of Payments, Statistical Yearbook, Recapitulation, 1958-1991,


Welfare effects

- Home's net change = $A+B-C$.
- Partner's net change = $+D$.
- RoW's net change = $-E$.



Analysis of a Customs Union

- European integration involved a sequence preferential liberalisations but all of these were reciprocal.
 - In example, both Home & Partner drop T on each other's exports.
- Need to address the 3-nation trade pattern.




Analysis of a Customs Union

- FTA vs Customs Unions.
 - Given symmetry 3-nation set up, FTA between Home and Partner is automatically a customs union.
 - Home-Partner CU has Common External Tariff (CET) equal to T
 - in the real world, things are more complicated.
- Analysis is simply a matter of recombining results from the unilateral preferential case.
 - In market for good 1, analysis is identical.
 - In market for good 2, Home plays the role of Partner.
 - In market for good 2, Partner plays role of Home.

Welfare effects of a customs union

- In market for good 1:
 - Home change = $A+B-C_1-C_2$.
- In market for good 2:
 - Home change = $+D_1+D_2$.
- NB: $D_1=C_1$.
- Net Home impact = $A+B-C_2+D_2$.
- Partner impact identical.
- RoW loses.




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Trade creation & diversion

- Trade creation & diversion is jargon that is often used.
 - It is imprecise, but widely used.
 - Intuition for why it is so popular, despite its shortcomings.
 - It captures ambiguity of welfare gains in two words.
- “Discriminatory liberalisation”.
 - Liberalisation
 - = tends to improve welfare ~ trade creation
 - Discrimination
 - -= tends to diminish welfare ~ trade diversion


Not just tariffs ...

Figure 1a Index of institutional integration of the EU-6 (i.e., Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) that started integrating in 1957



Frictional barrier preferential Liberalisation

- In market for good 1:
 - Home change = $A+F$.
- In market for good 2:
 - Home change = $+D$.
- Net Home impact:
 - = $A+F+D$.
 - Unambiguously positive.
- Partner gains same.
- RoW loses.



Customs Union vs FTA

- FTA like CU but no Common External Tariff.
 - Opens door to ‘tariff cheats’,
 - goods from RoW destined for Home market enter via Partner if Partner has lower external tariff, called ‘trade deflection’.
 - Solution is ‘rules of origin’ meant to establish where a good was made.
 - Problems: Difficult and expensive to administer, especially as world get more integrated.
 - Rules often become vehicle for disguised protection.
- Despite the origin-problem in FTAs, almost all preferential trade arrangements in world are FTAs.
 - CU’s require some political integration.
 - Must agree on CET and how to change it, including anti-dumping duties, etc.

WTO Rules

- A basic principle of the WTO/GATT is non-discrimination in application of tariffs.
- FTAs and CUs violate this principle.
- Article 24 permits FTAs and CUs subject to conditions:
 - Substantially all trade must be covered
 - Cannot pick and choose products.
 - Intra-bloc tariffs must go to zero within reasonable period.
 - If CU, the CET must not on average be higher than the external tariffs of the CU members were before.
 - In EEC's CU this meant France and Italy lowered their tariffs, Benelux nations raised theirs (German tariffs were about at the average anyway).

Kemp Wan Theorem

- Possible to alter CET to get Pareto improvement.
- Form CU and adjust CET to ensure zero external trade effect (thus welfare impact on RoW is zero).
- Treat external trade vector as part of endowment vector & First Welfare Theorem tells us FT between partners achieves FB and so is better than distorted equilibrium.
- Not practical, but an intellectual landmark (FTAs need not be bad).